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CREATING ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES*
James R. Hudson
Pennsylvania State University - Capitol Campus
1971
During the past several decades there has been a persistent
and constant trend in our society that has not gained the prominence
it deserves. This trend has been the continuous growth in the
autonomy and power of public bureaucracies. The community power
literature, for example, has systematically ignored public bureau-
cracies in its search for the power structure of cities (Aiken and
Mott, 1970). The reasons why public bureaucracies have been over-
looked by these researchers stem from a number of theoretical and
methodological shortcomings that need not concern us here. The
point, however, is that we have not regarded public bureaucracies
as loci of power in our cities.
The resources these agencies command indicate the tremendous
impact public bureaucracies have on municipal governments. What
is perhaps most crucial about the fiscal impact public bureaucracies
have is that their operating costs are often fixed within narrow
limits, and mandated salary increments commit future resources.
Urban mayors find themselves constrained from innovative activities
because their discretionary funds are limited.
If we consider the relationships between public bureaucracies
and their clientele, the power of these agencies is even more apparent.
The changes in the social organization of our urban communities have
made these agencies more central to the lives of the citizens in
these communities than they were previously. They now make a number
of critical decisions that directly affect the lives of millions of
persons.
Amos Hawley has argued that units within a system have two
types of power. The first he calls functional power -- the power
needed to execute a function -- and the second derivative power:
"that which spills over external relationships and regulates the
interaction between parts" (1963:423). I am claiming that public
bureaucracies have both types of power but particularly, the latter.
I will clarify in detail below why this is so.
To begin with functional power or internal organizational
characteristics, we note that public bureaucrats have increasingly
come under the protection of civil service. Many of these positions
were formerly part of a patronage system and therefore subject to
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the discipline of political regimes. Civil service regulations,
complete with elaborate due process, have removed the members of
these organizations from direct political manipulation. They have
also produced a good deal of organizational rigidity with the
standardization of job descriptions, promotions, transfers and the
like (Rogers, 1968: 266-323; Sayre and Kaufman, 1961: 402-451).
In addition to expansion of civil service categories, an increasing
demand among certain civil servants for recognition as professionals
fosters autonomy and thereby reduces the direct influence of those
without similar credentials (Gittel, 1967; Willbern, 1954).
Civil service reform and professionalization could potentially
contribute to politically neutral agencies capable of carrying out
their mandate in classical bureaucratic terms. But at the same
time these organizations have gained more hegemony over their
internal operations, i.e., more functional power, the members of
these agencies have banded together into partisan employee associations
that are politically active. In short, the internal control frees
energies for participation in external relations. The goals of these
employee associations include not only control over scarce appropriations
but also over job descriptions, promotion and tenure proceedings, and
working conditions in general with additional demands that support
their autonomy at the work place.
But the political actions of public bureaucracies do not end
with their activities as bargaining agents. In many cases they have
taken their demands into the streets and employed such strategies as
"Job actions" and strikes to gain their particular ends. The public
response of elected officials to these actions suggests the power
these agencies command. Elected officials realize that these
employees are critical constituencies in municipal elections,
further enhancing their power and potential power.
I should not slide over this last point without commenting
on the use public agents have made of the bureaucracies themselves.
Job actions, strikes, strict rule enforcement and other techniques
directly involve the agencies in politics. By curtailing services
or disrupting them, the public servants hope to mobilize support
and pressure in the wider community that will be directed toward
elected officials. Such tactics clearly undermine the political
neutrality these agencies once projected.
These trends would be interesting in themselves, indicating,
as they do, the changing character of public bureaucracies. But
other developments have placed them more prominently in the public
eye. Much current social policy discussion revolves around whether
citizens are receiving fair, just, or equal treatment at the hands
of public bureaucracies. There are complaints about mismanagement
of cases or discriminatory treatment by government bureaucrats,
such as unnecessarily severe standards for receipt of public welfare
assistance, refusal of emergency service by a hospital, or unwarranted
suspension of a child from school. Public bureaucracies have not
met the demands for which they were created and rather than con-
tributing to the solutions of problems have become part of the
problem itself.
But, as with every trend there have been counter trends, and
in the case of public bureaucracies a number of strategies have been
suggested that would make them more accountable. Accountability
cannot be conceptualized as a uniform problem across bureaucracies.
Citizens are not homogeneous with regard to their relations to
public bureaucracies and the kind of accountability desired. For
example, the tax-paying, employed citizen certainly differs from
the unemployed, welfare recipient with regard to what each expects
from social welfare agencies. Elected officials also have interests
in the manner in which these agencies operate and the degree to
which their policies can become politicized. In the extreme case,
politicians are reluctant to see certain policies promulgated that
would create new constituencies and upset the political balance
in their jurisdictions.
I have not as yet come to grips with one of the more complicated
questions In creating accountable public bureaucracies, that is, for
what should the bureaucracy be accountable. On the one hand, it can
be argued that they should be accountable for delivering services
fairly and equitably, but this does not address the more important
issue of evaluating the services delivered. To distribute poor
education equitably seems a dubious achievement. There have been
recommendations that what is needed is some kind of "social accounting"
that would measure the effectiveness of public agencies to insure
that they were meeting their mandates. Under such a system goals
would be established geared to agency performance. Failure to meet
these goals would result in alterations of policy, staffing and
administration. If my thesis is correct, the public bureaucracies
themselves would be deeply involved in establishing standards which
would be negotiated in the political realm where they would continue
to exercise a good deal of power. Professional associations of all
kinds would jockey to make sure that their standards were the
acceptable standards with the predictable outcome that the balance
of power would not be seriously changed.
But there have been some efforts to alter the traditional
client-agency relationships. I will focus primarily upon those
strategies that have been employed and suggested that would create,
at least for the clients, accountable public bureaucracies.
From my observations and readings four major strategies have
gained prominence in the past decade: confrontation (Lipsky, 1970),
legal action (Hannon, 1969), community control and citizen-initiated
complaint procedures (Altshuler, 1970; Handler, 1969; Hudson, 1968).
Confrontations involve the mobilization of the client population to
challenge directly actions taken or not taken by public agencies.
It involves such tactics as sit-ins, picketing, occupation of
offices. The clients seek immediate alterations or explanations of
official policies. Another objective is to gain through publicity
an understanding of the clients' problems and the intransigence
of the public agencies. As a tactic it has limitations, since
continuous confrontations drain the resources and energies of the
protestors. By its very nature, it is non-bureaucratic and if
some permanent rapprochement is to occur the demands must become
routinized and therefore bureaucratized.
Legal action, and particularly legal action under certain
OEO programs, employs existing political institutions and seeks
to redefine client-agency relations, changing the role of client
from a supplicant to that of a rights bearing citizen. Its
effectiveness is greatest in those instances where class action
cases are feasible. Unlike confrontation it can depend upon a
single client or a few clients to carry the case to completion,
eliminating the necessity to keep a constituency constantly
mobilized. A number of significant decisions have been reached
using this strategy. It is limited because what it can address
itself to is circumscribed by the legislation governing these
agencies. It is not an equal counter-weight to the position of
the public bureaucracies in the political power structure.
The third strategy, community control, seeks to break down
public agencies into smaller, autonomous units that are more
responsive to the needs of local communities. It rests upon the
assumption that indigenous populations have a better understanding
of the services needed in the local community and the most effective
ways of delivering these services. It further assumes that sufficient
talent exists at the local level to staff the administrative apparatus
of the agencies. Yet if public employees continue to be organized
as city wide units with political power that extends beyond the
local community, there will remain an imbalance of power. Local
control does not eliminate civil service reforms even though it
may modify them. The same issues public agents raise at the
municipal level will not disappear at the local level.
The final strategy for making public bureaucracies accountable
to their clientele are citizen-initiated complaint procedures
represented by fair hearing procedures in social welfare agencies
and civilian controlled police review boards. Underlying all such
review procedures are the assumptions of citizen competence and of
the willingness of the citizen to challenge an agency with which
he has an on-going relationship.
For the most part grievance procedures have been located
within the administrative agency itself (Minter, 1964; Handler,
1969). It should be obvious that such placement does not encourage
neutrality. Citizen-initiated complaint procedures seek to settle
complaints serially. Unlike confrontations, legal aid, or community
control, the objective is to resolve a given complaint at a given
time. The serial settlement of complaints does not open the agency
up for general review of policies. The issue as seen from the point
of view of the agency is that in a specific case some mismanagement,
miscalculation or oversight may have occurred and its particularistic
characteristics can be adjudicated. It is important to note that
citizen-initiated complaint procedures operate at the delivery
level of the organization and do not penetrate beyond the periphery.
Such a strategy may accommodate a few dissatisfied clients, but
does not call for serious review of organizational policy.
None of the strategies I have reviewed takes into account the
power and autonomy that public bureaucracies have obtained. While
the public bureaucrats are part of the power system, these accounta-
bility strategies do not seriously upset those power arrangements.
The public agents, through their employee associations, are a well-
mobilized political constituency. Their bargaining takes place at
the highest levels of municipal decision-making, often out of the
public eye.
On the other hand, the client population is not a well-
mobilized constituency. Although there has been an increase in
the militancy of certain client groups, these have not been welded
into an articulate political force. What is needed is a parallel
organization of clients and potential clients that can successfully
challenge the hegemony of the bureaucracies.
To conclude, the creating of accountable public bureaucracies
remains problematic. The set of strategies reviewed here does not
take into account the power these agencies hold. To make public
bureaucracies more accountable than they are now will require some
of the power they have lost in their ability to monitor public
bureaucracies. The client population itself needs to achieve some
kind of parity with these agencies in order that their position
does not remain one of a passive recipient. A public office may
be a public trust, but it appears that we need some new kind of
"trust-busting."
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